

THE GREAT GNIDNIWNU BEGINS

Executive Summary

ieC believe a [Great Unwinding](#) is now underway of the policymaker stimulus that has dominated markets since 2009. This has been inevitable for some time, with the key questions being around timing and the potential implications.

Another key question, of course, is how did such an Unwinding became necessary, with all the risks for economic and social stability that it creates? To answer this question, we have assembled the Budget Outlook posts that we have published in October each year since 2007. They show it was by no means inevitable, had realistic policies been adopted.

The Outlooks start in 2007 by forecasting the major financial Crisis. In 2008, they provided advice on how best to survive it, and in 2009 argued policymakers should 'take the pain' of adjusting to the New Normal of lower growth, created by globally ageing populations. 2010 focused on the Uncertainty surrounding future demand; 2011 on the impact of Austerity; and 2013 on the L-shaped recovery. 2013 highlighted how policymakers had created a VUCA world of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity by ignoring the New Normal. 2014 then highlighted how this failure had created a Cycle of Deflation.

ieC has won a reputation for independent thinking since it correctly forecast in the Financial Times and elsewhere that the US subprime market would cause a major financial crisis. These posts represent a recent example of our continued ability to see beyond the consensus viewpoint, and to highlight the key issues for the future.

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The blog posts appear here in unrevised form, as they appeared at <http://www.icis.com/blogs/chemicals-and-the-economy/>

2007. Budgeting for a Downturn

By Paul Hodges on 22 October, 2007

The 'consensus forecast' for 2008 is very optimistic, as I commented in my [post-EPCA note](#). It says oil will remain at \$70/bbl, that debt market problems will be contained, and margins will remain at 2007 levels. This is unusual, as the consensus is normally a base case scenario, with upside and downside variants.

And since EPCA, oil has already increased to around \$90/bbl. Back in [early July](#), when it was still 'only' \$70/bbl, I noted that it had the potential to approach \$100/bbl, and this still seems a real possibility. In these circumstances, it is perhaps no surprise that we are seeing an apparent 'boom' in demand, as downstream consumers rush to cover themselves before product prices move higher.

I first saw this effect happen in 1979, when the industry had a record year. It was only in 1980 that we discovered that the apparent ease with which the economy had weathered a rise in the oil price to \$30/bbl (around \$95/bbl in today's money), was a mirage. Could the same be happening today? I think it is worth considering very carefully as a possibility.

After all, whilst history never repeats itself, the underlying position in financial markets is clearly deteriorating. Bank of America (the 2nd largest US bank), came out with truly shocking Q3 results on [Thursday](#), whilst on Friday Caterpillar's CEO Jim Owens said the US was already '[near to, or even in, a recession](#)'. And new housing starts and US house prices were already very weak, even before the recent credit crunch.

There must surely be a real possibility that this latest upward rush by the oil price will be the catalyst that finally causes the US consumer to cut back on non-essential spending. Equally, the continuing problems in the banking sector may well turn off the tap of consumer, and maybe even corporate, lending.

If I was drawing up budgets for 2008, I would be putting in place contingency plans for just such an outcome, even whilst crossing my fingers that I would not have to use them.

2008. Budgeting for Survival

By Paul Hodges on 19 October, 2008



I prefer to be optimistic. But 30 years in industry has taught me to be extremely realistic. So my motto for 2009 Budgets is 'batten down the hatches'.

Companies are likely to be sailing in some very rough seas, with treacherous currents and plenty of dangerous rocks. Survival, not growth, is therefore the prudent objective.

The key question is whether your business is robust enough to survive an extended period of low volumes and margins, against a background of tight credit markets, and continuing volatility in oil and currency markets?

Companies therefore need to change their 2009 budget process in response to this challenge. Normally, they would develop a 'base case', and then investigate 'upside' and 'downside' scenarios. This year, companies should instead focus on the key variables around their survival Budget, so that they are prepared for most possible outcomes.

- ❖ **Demand.** 2009 is likely to see global recession (less than 3% GDP growth). Chemical demand will be badly hit, as it is focused on consumer spending, particularly housing/construction and autos. Hopefully, these areas may begin to bottom during 2009, but any real recovery is unlikely before 2011. Housing is at the heart of the current economic crisis, and it is hard to see demand recovering quickly. Unemployment is likely to rise, and banks will be reluctant to lend when house prices are still falling. Auto sales will also be weak, for similar reasons. Even companies selling into more favoured sectors, such as agrochemicals or pharmaceuticals, will probably see lower demand, and pricing pressure.
- ❖ **Oil prices.** I have correctly forecast every major movement in oil prices over the past year. This makes it easier to admit that I find 2009 very difficult to predict. The most likely outcome is that OPEC will cutback production and seek to hold \$70/bbl. But there are risks to this outlook. OPEC is bringing on major new production. Cutting production will also unleash a political storm. So OPEC will find it hard to make major cutbacks, and prices could temporarily fall as low as \$20/bbl, if the global recession proves deep. Yet supply/demand balances remain very tight. Surplus production is only c6% (5mbd). So a relatively small disruption could easily cause prices to rocket above \$100/bbl again.
- ❖ **China and Asia.** I am most concerned about likely levels of demand in this area. China's exports were 37% of GDP [last year](#). These volumes will inevitably decline whilst the west is in recession. And although some governments do have the financial reserves to respond by stimulating their domestic economies, many do not. Major [over-capacity](#) is also developing in the main 'building block' petchem

products, which will pressure prices and volumes. Most forecasters suggest that 8% growth could be the low for China's economy, compared to the 10%+ seen in the past decade. I worry that it could fall to 5% at the eventual bottom of the cycle. This would have serious implications for the region.

- ❖ **Credit.** Governments have just spent \$3.5 trillion to rescue the global banking system. I believe they were [right to do this](#), as otherwise the world faced a certain Depression. But governments will have to fund this spending, and so will 'crowd out' other borrowers. As a result, credit is likely to remain tight, causing major problems for some companies. In turn, the chemical industry's well-known inter-dependency means that there is a serious risk of a domino effect, whereby the collapse of one company brings down others in the value chain. We are already seeing this occur amongst suppliers to the US auto industry, with multiple collapses taking place as one company goes under. Those exporting or importing will also have to manage continuing currency volatility. CFOs will need maximum support from their commercial colleagues, in order to correctly identify and manage these risks.

By now, you may be asking whether I see no 'silver lining' amidst the storms I am forecasting? Indeed, cash-rich companies will certainly find themselves in a powerful position to negotiate better terms, and to undertake M&A. But I would be cautious about M&A opportunities. 2009-10 is not likely to be a repeat of 1997-8, or 2002-3, when there was a strong rebound. Therefore I would suggest that any opportunity, or 'rescue', should be assessed against the possibility that we are now in a multi-year recession which may last to 2011-12.

[Last year](#), I challenged the consensus, correctly forecasting the 2008 downturn. Today, I certainly hope that this 2009 forecast will prove too pessimistic. Its aim is to provide CEOs and business managers with a realistic scenario, so you can 'test' your own thinking. I welcome debate on these key issues, and will be happy to provide further advice on the practical issues raised by the analysis.

2009. Budgeting for a New Normal

By Paul Hodges on 17 October, 2009



2010 should be a better year for the chemical industry, as demand grows in line with a recovery in global GDP.

But a quick V-shaped return to the 2003-7 Boom years in terms of volumes/margins seems unlikely.

Governments will worry about budget deficits, and may well scale down support for critical end-uses such as autos and housing. Equally, major amounts of new capacity, planned during the Boom years, will start to come onstream in the Middle East and Asia.

In effect, therefore, 2010 will be a year of transition to a [‘new normal’](#). I expect global GDP growth rates to average around 2.5%- 3% for the next few years, the 1980-2000 average. This will be a significant reduction from the 3.5%-4% levels seen in the Boom years.

The rationale for this change is that we will start to see a rebalancing of the global economy. The West will see lower consumption, as people rebuild their savings, and borrow less. In turn, this will mean lower export demand for the emerging economies. The outcome will be a more sustainable world economy, but it will be a difficult journey.

- ❖ **Growth Forecasts.** Most markets are mature, and growth rates are therefore tied to GDP. I would therefore suggest that companies review their forecast growth rates for individual businesses in the light of their expectations for global GDP growth. One of the problems of the Boom years was that arbitrary growth rates (often of 5% or more), were assumed for many products. This also led to a perception that major amounts of new capacity were needed to meet this assumed demand. A more realistic view of demand would highlight potential problems of over-capacity, and perhaps encourage companies and governments to address the problems this will bring.
- ❖ **Demand.** On a global basis, chemical output is now [back at 2006 levels](#), having lost 3 years of growth. If GDP now grows as I expect, then demand from key sectors such as construction/housing, autos and electronics should improve next year. But the impact of government stimulus measures will make for a bumpy ride. The end of specific measures will cause major falls in perceived demand, whilst new stimuli will create short-term upward fluctuations. Excellent supply chain management will therefore be required, and Boards will need to keep a very careful eye on underlying trends.
- ❖ **Protectionism.** Unemployment is set to become a key political issue in the West, as economies adjust to the ‘new normal’. Hopefully, it should peak in 2010, but is unlikely to quickly return to previous levels. Arguments about the ‘export of jobs’ will therefore increase, and lead to a rise in anti-dumping activity. In turn this will cause job losses in emerging economies. Chemical companies will need to keep a close eye on the political arena, as they operate in a complex value chain, and may not otherwise appreciate the potential impact of a development in a key supplying or consuming industry.
- ❖ **Credit issues.** A recovery in demand puts great strains on cash-flow, and many companies go bankrupt as a result. This could be a particular problem in the current recovery, given the underlying fragility of large parts of the banking system. CFOs will need to institute robust monitoring mechanisms, and be prepared to keep customers on ‘cash before delivery’ terms if they have grounds for concern. New customers represent a particular risk, if their credit history is weak, even though their promised volume may be attractive.
- ❖ **Oil prices.** These are likely to remain volatile in 2010, as speculative price movements linked to traders’ bets on the US\$’s value will continue. Neither \$100/bbl, nor a return to \$40/bbl, would be a great surprise on a day-to-day basis.

But underlying supply/demand balances may well remain weak in 2010, in spite of the expected economic recovery. Thus we might see prices coming under more pressure during 2010. \$50/bbl might be an average price, in the absence of major geo-political events.

Overall, I expect 2010 to be a transition year. Full economic recovery is unlikely to take place much before the 2011/13 timeframe. But the return of economic growth will offer companies the [opportunity](#) to identify likely future market needs. Those that focus on this new reality, rather than simply hoping for a quick return to the Boom years, will position themselves for future success.

2010. Budgeting for a Downturn

By Paul Hodges on 23 October, 2010



SCENARIOS 2011-13



BASE CASE

GLOBAL GDP 3% AVERAGE, OIL \$60-80/bbl OIL,
CONTINUED FINANCIAL MARKET VOLATILITY

UPSIDE CASE
Inflation returns

GLOBAL GDP >3.5% AVERAGE, OIL >\$80/bbl,
RECESSION BOTTOMED 2009/10, THEN RECOVERY

DOWNSIDE CASE
Deflation emerges

GLOBAL GDP 2.5%, OIL PRICE <\$60/BBL
BANKING SYSTEM UNDER MAJOR STRAIN

REGIONAL DIVERSITY

G7 ECONOMIES DEMOGRAPHICS WILL LEAD TO LOWER GROWTH
BRIC/EMERGING ECONOMIES THEREFORE NEED GREATER DOMESTIC FOCUS

THE 'JOKERS'



GEO-POLITICS, DEBT MARKETS,
US \$: €, PROTECTIONISM,
EUROZONE PRESSURES,
CHINA DEVALUATION

When elephants fight, those around them need to be cautious. And this is the prospect for 2011-13, as the Western countries try to force the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to export less and import more, the so-called 'rebalancing' strategy.

Thus Budgeting for Uncertainty seems the right title for my annual Outlook for the chemical industry. Key factors that will contribute to this uncertainty include:

- ❖ **The USA** is aiming to rebalance the world economy by forcing the BRICs to reduce exports and instead focus on expanding domestic demand. This proposed rebalancing represents a major change from the past 20 years of export-driven development by the emerging economies, and will not be achieved overnight.

- ❖ **Europe** is making a 180 degree shift in policy, by abandoning previous efforts to stimulate its economy. It is instead planning to achieve budget balances by reducing spending and increasing taxes. It is also lining up alongside the USA in hoping to increase its exports to the BRICs, whilst reducing imports from them.
- ❖ **The BRICs** themselves are between a rock and a hard place. They were not the cause of the financial Crisis, but they are the ones on whom the major burden of adjustment may fall. The principal instrument of change will be the exchange rate, as the West aims to force China and others to revalue their currencies quite sharply.

These macro factors clearly raise more questions than answers. Even the issue of timescale is unclear, with the US suggesting it might take a full Budget cycle of at least 3 years for real changes to be observed. Plus, of course, there is absolutely no guarantee that the West will get its way, or that the whole exercise may not end in tears.

On the other hand, everything might go extremely well, with a renewed burst of co-operation as seen immediately after the Lehman collapse in Q4 2008. If the G20 Group of the major economies really worked together, then demand could easily be stronger, rather than weaker.

My view is that Scenario planning is the only solution when faced with so many different variables. The idea is to establish a Base Case, and then develop Upside and Downside Cases which are reasonable projections of what might happen if everything went very well, or very badly. My own effort to help kick-start this process is shown in the chart above:

BASE Case. This suggests we will see global GDP growth of 3%, with oil staying in the \$60 – \$80/bbl range of the past 18 months. We will still see financial market volatility, but no major collapses. It is the classic ‘muddle through’ type of Scenario.

UPSIDE Case. This assumes that the G20 achieves a ‘grand bargain’ to rebalance the world economy, allowing GDP to grow at above 3.5%. Inflation would probably become a major issue under this Scenario, causing oil prices to move above \$80/bbl.

DOWNSIDE Case. Instead of increased international co-operation, countries put their own interests first and adopt beggar-my-neighbour policies. GDP growth would probably fall to 2.5%, and the oil price below \$60/bbl, with the banking system under major strain as Deflation took hold.

The slide also suggests a number of ‘Jokers’ that companies may want to consider. These include changing demographics, such as the ageing of the Western baby-boomers. And, of course, one can never ignore the potential impact of geo-political events, such as a bombing of Iran’s nuclear plants, or new tensions with N Korea.

Of course, it would be possible to simply adopt a Base Case Scenario, and assume that this will work out. But the chances of this occurring are probably less than 50%, so it would be

highly risky. Instead, I would strongly recommend businesses to adopt a version of the above framework, using their own ideas for Base, Upside and Downside Scenarios.

By adopting this process, businesses can then test out key assumptions in advance. They can also develop mitigation strategies, in case events begin to diverge from the Base Case view. As always, I will be very happy to advise on the process, if this would be helpful.

2010 has been a surprisingly good year for many companies. We can certainly hope that current performance will continue, but hope is not a strategy.

Scenario planning will give businesses the chance to adopt the wisdom of the Scouting movement. Its motto, *'Be Prepared'*, seems the best possible approach in today's increasingly uncertain New Normal environment.

2011. Budgeting for Austerity – the Challenges and Opportunities

By Paul Hodges on 25 October, 2011



The 2012-14 Budget period offers great opportunities, as well as great challenges.

In the short-term, the challenges may well seem more important. But they should not blind companies to the fact that the opportunities have probably never been greater.

Of course, it is hard to be very optimistic about the shorter-term outlook for the global economy and chemical demand:

- ❖ [Oil prices](#) are at levels that have always led to recessions in the past
- ❖ Western [governments](#) are cutting back on spending and raising taxes
 - Emerging economies are raising interest rates to contain [inflation](#)
 - [Individuals](#) are suffering from squeezed incomes and job insecurity
 - Too many people are retiring with inadequate [pension](#) provision

The short-term risks are also more weighted to the downside:

- ❖ Many people still need to adjust to working in a more turbulent world. The BabyBoomer SuperCycle of demand meant the major economies suffered only [16 months](#) of recession in 25 years between 1982-2007
- ❖ Governments have failed to recognise the impact on demand of [demographics](#) and the ageing western populations. They have raised debt levels via stimulus programmes for no real gain
- ❖ The banking system remains under severe strain:

- It is dramatically undercapitalised in Europe
- USA banks face problems if property prices weaken again
- China's banks face losses from non-performing loans after the credit bubble of the past 3 years

And then, of course, there are the risks of rising social unrest in many countries as austerity programmes bite. Equally, the current generation of politicians has failed to display any real leadership that would help to move us beyond today's more difficult times. And, as always, there remain geo-political threats, such as the potential for Middle East wars.

Thus I feel there is only one possible title for this year's Outlook, 'Budgeting for Austerity, and New Opportunities'. This is because the real question, of course, is what happens next?

As **individuals**, will we lapse into apathy, and just give up in the face of the perceived difficulties? Or will we do as previous generations did, and confront today's problems with a view to setting out in a new direction?

I will discuss these opportunities in more detail tomorrow.

Budgeting for Austerity – the Opportunities

By Paul Hodges on 26 October, 2011



The 2012-14 Budget period offers great opportunities, as well as great challenges.

Will **companies** continue to focus on short-term developments in financial markets? Michael Porter's [Shared Value](#) concept instead offers us a powerful model for creating future growth.

Will **policymakers** stop focusing on the 24 hour news cycle and instead begin to set out the bigger picture? We need a vision for the future, and a clear idea of how to get there.

Are these decisions hard to take? No.

Has the world the resources to start in this new direction? Yes.

Would we enjoy the challenge? Yes

Can we start today? Yes.

We all know that companies are going to have to set difficult budgets for the next few years. They will also have to deal with continued uncertainty. We cannot rely on wise and all-seeing policymakers to lead us forward. They may well decide to do more of the things, such as [Quantitative Easing](#), that will make the situation worse instead of better.

But larger companies, in particular, could also start to examine how to expand long-term R&D. And every company could add a future dimension to its Budget in respect of the opportunities that will arise from the new markets being created by today's demographic and societal changes:

- ❖ Nearly a third of the Western population is now in the **55+ age bracket**. They have the incredible benefit of an extra decade of life expectancy, compared to previous generations. And they have money – maybe not a lot, but enough to buy useful products and services. Yet they remain woefully underserved and often unrecognised by most companies.
- ❖ People in emerging economies are starting to **move out of poverty** in large numbers. This 'bottom of the pyramid' market represents a wonderful opportunity to develop new products and services. Millions now have some money to spend for the first time in their lives.

The great megatrends of the future also offer vast opportunities for future growth. These involve the need to increase food production, improve water availability and reduce carbon footprint. They are vitally important, and also offer the potential for profitable future growth. So, of course, do the opportunities associated with increasing life expectancy.

Companies therefore have a clear choice as we move into the Budget period. I believe a New Normal lies ahead, as we are describing in the new [Boom, Gloom and the New Normal](#) eBook, co-authored with [John Richardson](#).

Winners will accept the challenges that it offers, and begin to move in a new direction. Losers, however, will remain frozen in the headlights, unable to take the first steps that will lead them to success.

Collectively, as the world's 3rd largest industry, chemical companies have enormous potential to do good at this most difficult time. But progress depends on each of us as individuals being prepared to adopt a positive outlook in the face of the problems with which we are surrounded.

As always, of course, I will be delighted to help any company that wishes to accept the challenges that offered by the transition to the New Normal. I am confident that they will discover a potential to be successful beyond their wildest dreams.

2012. Budgeting for an L-shaped recovery

By Paul Hodges on 20 October, 2012



As companies finalise Budgets for 2013-15, many will be thinking long and hard about the implications of the [IMF's](#) new economic forecast:

“The recovery continues, but it has weakened. In advanced countries, growth is now too low to make a substantial dent in unemployment. And in major emerging market economies, growth that had been strong earlier has also decreased.”

This is a sad reflection on the failure of the policies followed since [March 2009](#).

The reason for the disappointment is simple. As any business executive knows, demographics drive demand. But central banks and governments, with the exception of the [Bank of Japan](#), continue to ignore this vital fact.

This is why I have co-authored '[Boom, Gloom and the New Normal](#)'. Its aim is two-fold:

- ❖ To provide a robust and well-researched alternative view of likely future growth prospects
- ❖ To support Boards, investors and business managers in charting a new course to success and profitability

The key issue is that 297m people in the West will be in the New Old 55+ generation by 2015. They will be 31% of the population. Thus growth will inevitably be very much slower than in the 1982-2007 Supercycle years.

The reason is simple:

- ❖ When people are young, they need to buy new things
- ❖ And the Western Baby Boomers had lots of money to spend
- ❖ But now the kids have left home, and they don't need many new things
- ❖ Instead, they mainly buy replacement products, and only when these wear out

Equally, the economies of the developing world now have to refocus on domestic demand, and away from exports to the West. Their populations are very poor by comparison with the West, so they cannot replace the lost spending there. These New Poor have money to spend

for the first time in their lives, but their purchases also have to be both essential and affordable.

Thus I suggest that companies should budget for a continued L-shaped recovery. I first suggested this back in [December 2008](#). Sadly, events since then have only confirmed its analysis:

- ❖ Originally it was widely assumed we would see a quick V-shaped recovery
- ❖ Then a U-shape was expected, as recovery seemed delayed
- ❖ Next a W-shape was forecast, as new stimulus would finally lead to recovery
- ❖ But in reality, there has not been a sustained recovery
- ❖ Instead, we have seen volatile markets, as stimulus ebbs and flows

Clearly central banks and governments still believe they will eventually return the world to the SuperCycle. But as the great scientist Einstein wisely remarked, a good definition of lunacy is to repeat the same action, and expect different results.

Far-sighted companies will therefore ignore the temptation to believe that the next stimulus programme will be different. Instead, they will focus on what they can do to insulate their business from the turbulence around them, by focusing on the key issues that they can control.

The good news is that almost nobody is producing goods and services for the New Old 55+ generation in the West. And only a few, like Nissan, are starting to manufacture affordable goods for the billions in the New Poor generation in emerging economies. Therefore competitive pressures in these two vast and growing sectors are very low.

These are the two great business opportunities of our lifetimes. The companies that now use the 2013-15 period to access these, will be building the foundations for decades of future success.

2013. Budgeting for a VUCA world

By Paul Hodges on 26 October, 2013



"I use the term VUCA to describe the world – volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. It is very difficult for people to get a total picture."

Paul Polman, Unilever CEO

The title for the 2013 Budget Outlook chooses itself. If the CEO of Unilever, one of the world's great companies, can't get a "total picture", then what hope is there for the rest of us?

Of course, we might get lucky and come up with the winning numbers in the lottery. But that is not the approach most companies would want to take.

The range of genuine uncertainties is unprecedented:

- ❖ **Financial markets.** Central banks and policymakers have so far added [\\$33tn](#) of stimulus – nearly half the size of the global economy. It is the biggest financial experiment in history by a very long way. Therefore we cannot have any confidence that we know what happens next. Do they keep adding more stimulus forever? Do they try to ‘taper’ and stop the money printing, as the US Federal Reserve has suggested? Or ????
- ❖ **Debt bubbles.** The only central banker to forewarn of the financial crisis in 2007 was [William White](#), then BIS chief economist (the central banks’ bank). Ominously, he warned [last month](#) that *“This looks like to me like 2007 all over again, but even worse...And we have added a whole new problem with bubbles in emerging markets that are ending in a boom-bust cycle”*
- ❖ **Oil and commodity markets.** It is clear that I am now not the only one to believe that central bank liquidity has caused these markets to lose their power of [price discovery](#). Today’s consensus assumption of \$100/bbl oil forever is in fact the least likely option. Whilst Ed Morse, commodities head at Citi, has just published a detailed outlook titled [‘The end of OPEC’](#)
- ❖ **The Four Butterflies.** The Eurozone crisis; US political dysfunction over the debt/budget issues; rising interest rates; China’s new economic policies. All are now flapping their wings very hard, as I feared back in [August](#). Each has the potential to deliver a cold winter on their own. And now there is the [spying scandal](#), causing further mistrust between Western leaders
- ❖ **Demographics.** Although still largely unrecognised, the world’s ageing populations are the real cause of today’s [New Normal](#) and its changing demand patterns. Sadly, out of touch policymakers still seriously argue that demographics don’t impact the economy. And the longer this core issue is ignored, the more problems it stores up for individuals, companies and countries for the future

How can companies possibly deal with this long, but by no means complete, list of major uncertainties? Should they simply throw up their hands in despair, and stick with a consensus forecast that they know will be wrong?

This may seem tempting. And indeed, it has been the default policy until recently. But today, the balance of risk and reward is starting to change. Staying with the status quo is more painful than adopting a New Normal-based approach. After all, how many more times can you explain to your boss that your budget has not been delivered? And how many more times can your management tell shareholders that key targets continue to be missed?

Thus in different ways, and at different times, companies are starting to look at the world from new angles. Instead of relying on growth forecasts based on ratios to IMF forecasts of

GDP, they are instead thinking about the [potential needs](#) of people at different income levels, and at different ages. And they are starting to find that it might not be so difficult after all to make the transition. It might even be that it is the first step, that is the most difficult.

This is certainly my experience as I continues to work with Boards, ExCos and management teams around the world on these super-critical issues. The release of energy, when reality is acknowledged, goes a long way towards putting that critical first step in place.


The key, I have found, is for each company to then develop its own VUCA for success:

- ❖ **Volatility.** Developing a road-map requires **Vision**
- ❖ **Uncertainty.** A strategic **Understanding** of the changes underway is essential
- ❖ **Complexity.** The planning process requires **Clarity** over implementation
- ❖ **Ambiguity.** Unforeseen events will place a premium on **Agility**

Nobody said business was meant to be easy. But companies and investors who take on the challenge of today’s VUCA world will be increasingly successful as we move through the 2014 – 2016 budget period.

2014. Budgeting for the Cycle of Deflation

By Paul Hodges on 4 November, 2014 in [Economic growth](#) [Edit](#)



There is no “business as usual” scenario possible for the 2015-2017 Budget period. Over the past 15 years (since the “[dotcom bubble](#)” burst in 2000), policymakers have provided increasing amounts of stimulus to support the economy. Now, finally, we are in the endgame, as the [Great Unwinding](#) takes place.

This presents us all with major challenges:

- ❖ Most executives and investors under the age of 40 have spent their working lives in the post-‘dotcom bubble’ world. They have learnt to expect that central banks will intervene more or less continuously to support the economy. They have no experience of a world where markets are left to balance supply and demand
- ❖ Equally, those over 40 have recognised there is no going back to the Boomer-led SuperCycle that dominated their working lives before the ‘dotcom bubble’. There is instead an increasing acceptance that a move into a [New Normal](#) is underway. China recently announced its economic policy will “[adapt to the New Normal state](#)”

Thus our past experience may well not be a good guide to the future.

3 SCENARIOS FOR THE 2015 – 2017 PERIOD

What does this mean for Budgets?

Firstly, it means we likely have a very hard road ahead. China and the US are both now ending their vast stimulus programmes – but not before [China’s debt increased by \\$11tn](#), and [US debt increased by \\$10tn](#). Globally, around \$35tn has been spent in the major economies just since 2009.

Two developments on Friday highlight the risks we face:

- ❖ One is that policymakers may [panic](#) and rush to expand stimulus programmes again. Friday saw this happen in Japan, with the Governor of the Bank of Japan deciding to ‘[double down](#)’ on the failing [Abenomics](#) policy, warning “*We are at a critical moment. There is a risk that victory over deflation may be delayed.*”
- ❖ A second is that price wars become common. Energy markets face major supply gluts, leading [Iraq’s oil minister](#) to tell Parliament “*There is a price war within OPEC. The market’s fundamentals have changed, with an extra 3 million barrels/day of crude entering the market at a time when growth in China and India has slowed.*”

The result is that the world faces 3 quite distinct outlooks for the 2015 – 2017 period:

All’s well that ends well. Of course, we must all hope that policymakers have been right all along. In this case, we will still face a bumpy ride for the next few years. But over time, confidence will grow as it becomes clear that strong economic growth is being restored.

Global hard landing. The opposite is argued by those who believe stimulus programmes have put the global economy at risk. They fear a global ‘hard landing’ is the likely outcome, as stimulus is withdrawn and underlying problems are exposed to view

My own view is that whilst both of these outcomes are certainly possible, neither are very likely. Demographics must drive demand, and today’s [globally ageing populations](#) cannot recreate the Boomer-led SuperCycle of economic growth. Equally, policymakers would have to be completely incompetent to allow a global ‘hard landing’ to occur.

The most likely Scenario focuses on the Great Unwinding of policymaker stimulus now underway. This is taking us into the final stages of the Cycle of Deflation, which has been building since the ‘dot-com bubble’ burst in 2000.

THE CYCLE OF DEFLATION

The key feature of this Scenario is that **the world is now becoming demand-constrained**. In the past, advantaged-cost supply was key to success. “[If you build it, they will come](#)” was the motto.

But today, it is becoming widely recognised that we have a supply glut in most key areas – certainly in energy and commodity markets, and also further down most value chains. As the chart shows, we are thus now moving from the stage of Competitive Devaluation into Protectionism, as all the new capacity comes online:

- ❖ **Competitive devaluation.** This began with China in 2001, as part of its export-oriented development model. The US followed in 2009 with [QE](#) – again with the aim of promoting exports. [Japan](#) has tried the same policy since 2012, and more recently the Eurozone has followed. All, of course, are responding to a lack of domestic demand
- ❖ **Protectionism.** Globalisation is already becoming a memory. Sadly, the World Trade Organisation has recently [failed](#) even to streamline customs procedures. Instead, countries are moving towards bilateral agreements. This makes it much easier for them to protect jobs by imposing tariffs
- ❖ **Plant closings.** Only a small number of plants have closed to date. But Protectionism means that any plant which depends on exports is at risk, as low-cost will no longer be key to success
- ❖ **Debt default.** Cash is king in a deflationary environment. Default risks are already rising, with [Blackrock](#) (the world’s largest asset manager) warning secondary markets are “broken”. Companies therefore need to pay down debt as fast as possible, and watch working capital like a hawk

It is impossible to overestimate the shock that the Great Unwinding is already creating. **The critical issue is that Deflation is now becoming inevitable.** It has two key effects:

- ❖ **Debt becomes very expensive,** as its cost is rising in real terms. So instead of borrowing, people focus on repaying debt as a top priority
- ❖ **Purchases are postponed** because prices will be cheaper tomorrow. So demand slows even further, as people see no rush to buy

Of course, deflation wouldn’t be a major issue today if markets had been allowed to operate normally after 2000. Most Western countries had moved into [budget surplus](#), and were not burdened with today’s debt levels.

But we are where we are.

About leC: leC is a London-based strategy consultancy advising Fortune 500 and FTSE 100 companies, investment banks and fund managers.



Paul Hodges

is a trusted adviser to major companies and the investment community, and has a proven track record of accurately identifying key trends in global marketplaces. He has been widely recognised for correctly forewarning of the 2008 global financial crisis. His analysis of the key role of demographics in driving the global economy is now attracting increasing interest from senior policymakers and executives.

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